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*Letter 81-2*  
*No... 50*      *May 22<sup>d</sup>. 1861*

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REMARKS  
UPON  
Mr. CLARKE's Sermons,  
Preached at  
ST. PAUL'S  
AGAINST  
*Hobbs, Spinoza, and other Atheists.*

Wherein 'tis Demonstrated:

- I. That Mr. C. by the Sceptical Hypothesis he employs, Absolutely cuts off all Possible Means of Knowing the Nature, or of Proving the Existence of the One Only True God, against *Hobbs*, *Spinoza*, or any other *Atheists* whatever.
  - II. That in Reference to God, or Spirits, he reduces *Humane Understanding*, to the most Incurable State of *Scepticism*.
- These Two Particulars are Handl'd and Prov'd Geometrically.
- III. The Reasons are produced which convince the Author of this Paper, that those Sermons do rather *Establish* than *Destroy*, do rather *Confirm* than *Confute* *Spinoza's Hypothesis*.

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London:

Printed for Jonathan Robinson at the Golden Lyon in  
St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1705.

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**I**F the Reader meets with Faults of Im-  
pression in these Sheets, he is desired to  
excuse them; and in Page 9. Line 18. to  
leave out the Words, *invented, and.*

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# REMARKS

UPON

## Mr. CLARKE's Sermons,

Preach'd at the

## Cathedral Church of St. Paul's,

AGAINST

## ATHEISM.

SINCE the Edifying Lecture at St. Paul's has been purposely established to Confute Atheism, and that this truly Great and Good End, is what Mr. Clarke professes to aim at in those Sermons he Preached in that Cathedral, and lately Printed for the Publick Good: I humbly conceive, whoever proves, that those Sermons are so far from Answering that End, that they absolutely cut off all possible Means of attaining it, and do rather Establish, than Destroy, what they apparently undertake to Confute, will be looked upon by Mr. C. himself, and every body else, as One who really intends to concur in his avowed Design, and to promote the End proposed by the Honourable Founder of that Lecture. This is the only End aimed at, in the following Sheets.

B

The

2. Remarks upon Mr. Clarke's Sermons

The Discourse in those Sermons, "is directed to  
" that sort of *Atheists*, who in the way of Specula-  
" tive Reasoning, and upon the Principles of Philo-  
" sophy pretend, that the Arguments brought against  
" the Being of God, appear stronger and more con-  
" clusive, *Page 5.* Mr. C. thinks it reasonable and  
" necessary to oppose these *Atheists* in their own way,  
" *Page 260.* And therefore will make use of no sort  
" of Authorities, but confine himself to the Rules of  
" strict and demonstrative Argumentation, *Page 15.*  
I likewise think it Reasonable and Necessary to Assist  
M. C. in his own Way, and to prove, by the Rules of  
strict and demonstrative Argumentation:

First, That the *Sceptical Hypothesis* established by  
Mr. Clarke in his Sermons, renders it absolutely Im-  
possible for him to Confute those very same *Atheists* he  
names, and pretends to argue against in those Ser-  
mons, or any other.

Secondly, That Mr. Clarke reduces Humane Under-  
standing to the most incurable State of *Scepticism*, in  
Reference to the *one only True God*; and deprives it of  
all possible Means of proving the Existence of that  
*Supreme Being.*

Thirdly, I shall produce the Reasons, which Con-  
vince me, that those Sermons, do rather Establish  
than Destroy, do rather Confirm than Confute Spinoza's  
*Atheism.*

To the end Mr. C. and the Reader may see, that I  
shall assist him here, in his *own Way*, I shall set before  
him an Idea of his *own Way*, by shewing in a few  
Words, wherein *Knowledge*, *Certainty*, the *strict Rules of*  
*Argumentation*, or *Demonstration*, do consist. I shall af-  
terwards lay down Mr. C's *Sceptical Hypothesis*, and *Spinoza's Atheism*; and then proceed to the Proof of the  
above-mentioned Particulars.

We know no Object but by the Intervention of its  
Idea. Humane Knowledge consists in the Perception  
of

of the Agreement, or Disagreement of two or more Ideas; It is twofold Intuitive and Demonstrative. The former consists in an immediate Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas. The latter in a Perception of their Agreement or Disagreement by the Intervention of a Third Idea. As in Intuitive, so in Demonstrative, there must be an immediate Perception of the intervening Idea, with the Ideas on both sides, with the Ideas under actual Consideration, and which we would compare, and then Unite or Disunite, according as we find they agree or Disagree, by the Intervention of this Third Idea, of this common Measure. Certainty of Knowledge consists in this very same Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas. Demonstration consists in annexing Ideas to articulate Sounds, Terms, or Words, and in Uniting or Disuniting those articulate Sounds in Propositions, according as the Ideas whereof they are Signs or Marks, do Agree or Disagree. Whatever Perception comes short of this spoken of here, neither is, nor can be Knowledge. In that Sense I shall take the Term, Knowledge, in the following Lines; and offer what has been now said, as a correct Idea of Mr. C's Way, of the strict Rules of Argumentation.

I shall at present set before you Spinoza's Opinion, as quoted and translated by Mr. C. in these Words,

*Page 50.*

Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our Time, who taught \* there is no difference of Substances; but that the Whole and every Part of the Material World is a Necessarily-existing Being; and that † there is no other God, but the Universe.

Opinion  
Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia, Ethic.  
Part. 1. Prop. 6.

Omnis substantia est necessario infinita. Ibid. Prop. 8.

Ad naturam substantia pertinet existere. Ibid. Prop. 7.

† Prater Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia. Ibid. Prop. 14.

## Remarks upon Mr. Clarke's Sermons

Pray take notice, by the by, that Spinoza is quite misrepresented and wronged in the English Translation; because this is a very material Observation; as you shall see hereafter. Spinoza says, That besides God, there neither is, nor can be conceived any other Substance. Let us now hear, what Sort or Kind of Substance this One Single Substance is, which he calls by the

**Extensio attributum Dei est,**  
five Deus est res extensa, Ethic.  
Part. 2. Prop. 2.

by an Extended Thing or Substance, to wit, a Material Substance.

Nam substantiam corpoream, qua non nisi infinita, non nisi unica, & non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi . . . nullà ratione divinà natura indignam esse dici potest, tametsi divisibilis supponatur, dummodo externa & infinita concedatur. Ethic. P. i. Schol. Prop. 15.

You see, he says, there neither is, nor can be, but One single Substance; that this One single Substance, is a Material Substance, and that this One single Material Substance is God. This destroys the Nature and Existence of the One Only True God. This is the only Foundation, the very Ground and first Principle of all the Ancient and Modern Atheists; as the Learned have observed, and is plain from the Nature of the Thing. This therefore is the Principle which Mr. C. must Confute in his Sermons, if he intends to confute Spinoza, or any other Atheist. Let us now read Mr. C's. Sceptical Hypothesis, which is this,

"What the Substance or Essence of that Being,  
" which is Self-Existent, or Necessarily-Existing, is;  
" we have no Idea, neither is it possible for us in any  
" Measure to comprehend, Page 74. Again, What it is,  
" I mean as to its Substance and Essence, we are in-  
" finitely unable to comprehend, P. 75. With Submission,  
I think.

## against A T H E I S M.

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I think Mr. C. should speak for himself, and instead of *We*, should say *I*; but by what he says, you see, he neither has, nor can have, any Idea of the Substance of God. Let us hear what he says concerning the Substance of Matter, and it is this. "We are utterly Ignorant of the Substance or Essence of all other Things; even of those Things which we converse most familiarly with, and think we understand best."— "All inanimate Beings have their Essence or Substance hidden from us in the deepest and most impenetrable Obscurity, Page 77. Again, "There is no Substance in the World, of which we know anything further, than only a certain number of its Properties or Accidents, Page 79. Tho' this Sceptical Hypothesis is absolutely false, and borrow'd from Mr. L. as other things in these Sermons are; yet it shews us, that as Mr. C. neither has, nor can have, any Idea of the Substance of God, so likewise, he neither has, nor can have, any Idea of the Substance of Matter.

We have observed, that to Confute Spinoza, Mr. C. must prove, That the Substance of God is not the Substance of Matter, i. e. That God is not Matter or Material. And I am now to prove, in his own Way, by the strict Rules of Argumentation, and from his own Sceptical Hypothesis, That it is absolutely Impossible for Mr. C. to make out that Great, and Fundamental Truth, against Spinoza, against that Atheist whom he pretends to Confute in his Sermons, though it can be easily proved against him, or against any other Atheist whatever. I prove my Charge thus:

It is absolutely Impossible for Mr. C. to Confute Spinoza, without perceiving and proving, That the Substance of God is not the Substance of Matter; that God is not Matter, or Material. This is Self-evident. It is impossible for Mr. C. either to perceive or prove, that the Substance of God, is not the Substance of Matter, but by Intuition, or by Demonstration. This is evident from the Definitions of Knowledge, Certainty, and Demonstration, settled before. Now it is impossible.

ble for Mr. C. to prove, That the Substance of God, is not the Substance of Matter; or, *vice versa*, either by Intuition, or by Demonstration. The two Parts of this Assertion are to be distinctly and singly made out, and shall be proved in this manner, beginning with Intuition.

It is impossible for him either to perceive or prove, That the Substance of God is not the Substance of Matter, by Intuition; but by perceiving and proving an *Immediate, Constant, Visible, Immutable, Necessary, Repugnancy, or Disagreement*, between the Idea of the Substance of God, and the Idea of the Substance of Matter. It is impossible for him to perceive this Repugnancy or Disagreement, but by bringing together in his own Mind, the two Ideas under *Consideration*, and therein by their *immediate Comparison, Fuxta-position or Application* one to another, perceive their necessary Repugnancy or Disagreement, one with another.

Now he declares in his *Sceptical Hypothesis*, that he neither has, nor can have, either the Idea of the one, or of the other; therefore it is absolutely impossible for him, by Intuition, either to perceive or prove, That the Substance of God, is not the Substance of Matter, that God is not Matter, or Material. All this is evident, both in it self, and from the Definitions before-mentioned.

As for Demonstration, it is impossible for Mr. C. either to perceive, or prove, this Way, That the Substance of God, is not the Substance of Matter, that God is not Matter, or Material, but by the Intervention of some *Third Idea*. Now, let him pitch upon any Third Idea, or Ideas whatever, either upon the simple Idea of one single Quality or Property, or upon a complex Idea, made up of a certain Set or Collection of the simple Ideas of single Qualities or Properties; it is impossible for him by the Intervention, either of the one, or of the other; either to perceive or prove against the Atheist Spinoza, that the Substance of God

is not the Substance of Matter, that God is not Matter or Material.

Whatever Third Idea he shall pitch upon, he cannot prove that the Substance of God is not the Substance of Matter, but by perceiving and proving a Constant, Visible, Immutable, Necessary Repugnancy or Disagreement, between the Substance of God, and the Substance of Matter, by the Intervention of this Third Idea. He cannot either perceive or prove this, without perceiving and proving the *Necessary Agreement* or *Disagreement* of this Third Idea, with the Ideas on both sides, with the Ideas under debate, with the Two Ideas he would compare together, and remove, separate, or disunite the one from the other, by the Intervention of this common *Measure* of this *Third Idea*. Now it is *impossible* for him, either to perceive, or to prove an immediate, necessary Agreement, or Disagreement of any Third Idea whatever, with either of the Ideas under debate, but by bringing his Third Idea, and the Ideas under debate, into his own Mind, and therein by their immediate Comparison, Juxta-position, or Application one to another, perceive their necessary Agreement or Disagreement. Now he declares in his *Sceptical Hypothesis*, that he neither has, nor can have, either the one, or the other of the Two Ideas under debate; and therefore it is absolutely impossible for him to bring together in his own Mind, Two Ideas which he neither has, nor can have, and therein to compare them with any Third Idea whatever. And since it is impossible for him to compare them with any Third Idea whatever, it is likewise *absolutely Impossible* for him, either to perceive, or to prove their immediate, necessary Agreement or Disagreement, with any Third Idea whatever. And since it is absolutely Impossible for him, by the Intervention of any Third Idea whatever, either to perceive, or to prove, a constant, immutable, visible, necessary Repugnancy or Agreement between the Ideas under debate; it is likewise absolutely

ly

ly Impossible for him by Demonstration, either to perceive, or to prove, That the Substance of God is not the Substance of Matter; that God is not Matter or Material.

Now these being the only Two Ways *possible* to perceive, or to prove any *Truth*; and it being absolutely Impossible for Mr. C. either Way, *i. e.* either by Intuition, or by Demonstration, either to perceive or prove, That the Substance of God is not the Substance of Matter; that God is not Matter or Material; it is absolutely Impossible for Mr. C. to Confute *Spinoza*, the very same *Atheist* he Names, and against whom he pretends to Argue in his Sermons. This is the First Particular I promised to make out. The Second is this, *viz.*

That Mr. C. reduces Human Understanding to the most incurable State of *Sceptism* in Reference to the One Only True God, and deprives it of all possible means of Proving the Existence of that Supreme Being.

I humbly conceive, that the most incurable State of *Scepticism*, wherein Humane Understanding can be considered, or to which it can be reduced, in Reference to the Object we speak of, is this, *viz.* To be utterly uncapable, either of perceiving, or proving, the Nature or Existence of the One Only True God; utterly unable to Difference or Distinguish that Supreme Being from the most Contemptible of his *Creatures*; from what the *Atheistical Shopkeeper*, Spinoza, most Blasphemously calls *God*. In a Word, to be unable to know, Whether God does, or does not Exist. Now, this is exactly the very same State to which Mr. C. reduces Humane Understanding by his *Sceptical Hypothesis*.

For it is absolutely Impossible for Humane Understanding, either to perceive, or prove, the Nature or Existence of the One Only True God, or to Difference or Distinguish that Supreme Being, from Spinoza's pretended Substance, but by Intuition, or by Demonstration.

Now,

Now, I humbly conceive, it has been proved in the preceding Lines, even in Mr. C's own Way, i. e. by the strict Rules of Argumentation, that according to his *Sceptical Hypothesis*, it is impossible for Humane Understanding, by the *Natural Use* of its Faculties, either to perceive, or to prove, the Nature and Existence of the One Only True God, or to Difference or Distinguish that Supreme Being from Spinoza's Material Substance. Hence it necessarily follows, that that *Sceptical Hypothesis* does reduce Humane Understanding, in Reference to the One Only True God, to the most incurable State of *Scepticism*, that it can be considered in, or reduced to. This is so very plain, that I need not to insist upon it, more particularly; or to detain you any longer upon this Second Point.

Indeed, that very same *Sceptical Hypothesis* has been invented, and of late purposely improved to deprive us of all possible Means, either of perceiving or proving, of Differencing or Distinguishing the One Only True God from Spinoza's Substance. This *Atheistical Shopkeeper* is the First that ever reduced *Atheism* into a *System*, and Mr. *Locke* is the Second; with this Difference, that the latter has only copied the former as to the main, Spinoza having, as he imagined, established the Existence of his One single Substance, and cut off the Means of perceiving or proving, that there are more than One, puts, and Answers this Question, viz. If any one does ask, by what Sign therefore shall we know the Diversity of Substances; let him read the following Propositions which prove, that there is but One Substance in the Whole World, and for this Reason, that Sign would be in vain sought for. As for the Substance it self, he says,

Si quis autem jam quæret, ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus distinguere, legat sequentes Propositiones, quæ ostendunt in renum naturā non, nisi unicam substantiam, existere, eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quæretur, Ethic. Part. I. Schol. Prop. 10.

Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus, pro ut in imaginatiōne est, quod sapere & facilius à nobis fit, reperiētur finita, divisibilis, & ex partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam, prout in intellectus est, attendimus, & eam, quatenus substantia est, concipimus, quod difficiliter me fit, tum, ut jam satis demonstravimus infinita, unica, & indivisibilis reperiētur, Ethic. Part. I. Schol. Prop. 15.

privē us of the Means, either of perceiving or proving, that there is more than One, or a different Substance from his Material Substance in the World.

Mr. L's only Design in Writing his Essay of Humane Understanding, was to establish Spinoz's Hypothesis. In this the Four Books, that compose the said Essay, do unanimously Center. He established it in that Book, and therein endeavoured to prove, that all things differ only but in a bare different Modification of the same Substance; which different Modifications, Qualities, or Properties, perceptible in the various Species of Beings, he calls by the new Name, Nominal Essence, which, he says, is the only Essence that distinguishes the different Species of Beings; the one from the other. Hear his own Words: The real Essences of Substances, if different from our abstract Ideas, i. e. Nominal Essences, cannot be the Essences of the Species we rank things into. For two Species may be one, as rationally as two different Essences, i. e. the Real and the Nominal Essence, be the Essence of one Species, Essay. B.3. C.3. S.12. That is, Mr. L and his Horse, and his Dog, may be One, as rationally, as that they should be differenced or distinguished the one from the other, but by their Nominal Essences, i. e. their External Qualities or Modifications. I need not to quote more out of him, for by far

If we consider Quantity, as it is in the Imagination, which is often easier and easi-  
lier done, it will be found Finite, Di-  
visible, and made up of Parts; but if  
we look upon it as it is in the Under-  
standing, and consider it as it is a Sub-  
stance, which is most difficult, then, as  
I have shewn already, it will be found  
Infinite, Indivisible, and but One.  
You see that Spinoz's One single Sub-  
stance is a Material Substance, and  
that he has endeavoured to de-

for the greatest part of his three last Books are employed in depriving us of the means to difference, or distinguish, or prove, that there is more than One real Substance, and to establish Spinoza's Sceptical Hypothesis, whose Basis is this; *We neither have, nor can have, the Idea of Substance by Sensation or Reflection,* Essay B. 1. C. 4. S. 18. Here he exceeds his Master Spinoza a little; and Mr. C. surpasses both of them, when after having assertedly That it is impossible for us, in any Measure, to comprehend the Substance or Essence of the Supreme Being, he adds: *We are utterly ignorant of the Substance or Essence of all other things,* Page 76. The next that appears may as reasonably say, That we are perfectly Blind. I perceive by several things in Mr. C's Sermons, that he borrowed his Sceptical Hypothesis from Mr. L. the Original of which Hypothesis being thus traced out, and the Design of its Invention thus discovered; I proceed to the Third Particular, which I promised to make out, viz.

To produce the Reasons which Convince me, that Mr. C's Sermons do rather Establish than Destroy, do rather Confirm than Confute Spinoza's Atheism, though I do not affirm, that this was his Intention.

They shall be drawn from these Four Heads. First, Because Mr. C. joyns his Endeavours with Mr. L's and Spinoza's, to confute the Arguments which destroy their Common Hypothesis.

Secondly, Because he uses the same Terms or Cant, whereby Mr. L. and Spinoza, make Thinking and Extension, Attributes of the same Substance.

Thirdly, Because he Misrepresents Spinoza and Hobbs, undertakes to confute Absurdities which they positively declare to be none of their Doctrine; and leaves the Hypothesis of one Substance, the only Ground and Foundation of all Atheism, untouched.

*Fourthly, Because he Restrains and Determines what he calls Self-Existing Being, as Mr. L. and Spinoza do, viz. to stand for one single Material Substance.*

Since I cannot run over every Particular, which Mr. C. has upon these several Heads, I shall examine those that I handle; so as that you may perceive by what shall be said, what might be said to the other Parts of those Sermons which shall not be spoken to in these Sheets. I shall handle them in the same Order wherin they have been now mentioned.

*Descartes and his Followers have asserted, and Mathematically proved, That the Essence of Matter consists in Length, Breadth, and Depth. That no extended Substance can think, nor any thinking Substance be extended. That Extension and Thinking are Attributes of two Substances, Originally and Eternally, different and distinct the one from the other. Spinoza, who would have in all but one single Substance, runs Counter to his Master, and asserts, That these Two Attributes, to wit, Thinking and Extension, are but Two different Modifications of one and the same Substance. Hence it is, that he blames Descartes, for making the Essence of Matter to consist in Extension*

*alone. Here are his own Words.*

Quod petis, an ex solo Extensionis conceptu rerum varietas a priori possit demonstrari, credo me jam satis clarè ostendisse, id impossibile esse; ideoque materiam à Cartesio male definiri per Extensionem, &c.  
Epist. 73.

*As to what you ask, to wit, whether by the Idea of Extension alone, the difference of Things may be proved, à priori, I believe I have already shown that to be impossible; and therefore Descartes was cut, when he placed the Essence of Matter in Extension.*

*And though Mr. L. takes it as a Commendation of himself to the World, to be the Scholar of so great a Master as Descartes, and must always acknowledge to that justly Admired Gentleman, the great Obligation of his first Deliverance from the unintelligible Way of Talking of the Schools*

Schools in his time, L. 1. B. W. p. 103. yet he joyns with Spinoza to oppose Descartes, when his Doctrine destroys the Hypothesis of One Substance. Mr. L. defines Extension, and says, 'Tis only the Space that lies between the Extremities of the solid coherent Parts of Body, Essay, B. 2. C. 13. S. 13. Then, in several places of his Essay, he Confutes the Cartesians for making the Essence of Body or Matter to consist in Extension, i. e. in the distance between the Extremities of the solid Parts of Matter, according to him. You know the Cartesians never asserted that the Essence of Body consisted in that Space, nor in any thing like it; but this extraordinary piece of Ingenuity and Gratitude, shews only, That Mr. L. would very willingly, but could not possibly Confute his Master; but still, to second Spinoza, he does what he can, and that's only to Misrepresent his first Deliverer.

Mr. C. with equal Success, seconds these Two Authors, and Exposes the Cartesians for making the Essence of Matter to consist in Extension. He says, "That when any one has done his utmost in endeavouring to imagine that an Eternal Infinite Being does not Exist, he cannot avoid imagining an Infinite Nothing. That with this Argument, the Cartesians, who supposed the Idea of Immensity to be the Idea of meer Matter, have been mightily perplexed. That they have contradicted themselves in Words upon this Subject. That it has been easier for them to be driven to that most intolerable Absurdity of asserting Matter \* to be in effect a Necessary Being, than to be able to remove out of their minds the Idea of Immensity, as Existing necessarily and inseperably from Eternity; Page 32, 33, &c. You see Mr. C. uses the Term Immensity for the Term Extension, and so, with him, they are synonymous, as I ap-

\* Mais peutetre que re rai-  
sonne mal, &c., i. e. But per-  
haps I argue ill, when I con-  
clude that the Property my  
Idea hath to represent Extensi-  
on (that is, in the Sense of the  
Cartesians, Matter) comes from  
Extension it self as its Cause,  
&c. Regis. Metaphys. L. 1. P. 1.  
C. 3.

pears very plainly from his Remark upon the Quotation he brings out of *Regis*, where he says, That *Extension*, in the Sense of the Cartesians, is Matter; and from his saying in the Text, That they suppose *Imminency* to be the Idea of meer Matter. With this Observation, I beseech you to take notice of the Words, Meer Matter; for a Reason you shall hear afterwards.

The Argument, as Mr. C. calls it, which has mightily perplexed the Cartesians, forced them to contradict themselves, and driven them to that most intolerable Absurdity of asserting Matter to be a necessary Being, is this, viz. *That when one has done his utmost in endeavouring to imagine there is no Eternal, Infinite, i. e. Extended Being, he cannot avoid imagining an Eternal, Infinite, i. e. Extended Nothing.* Now, this is no Argument at all, 'tis but a bare Assertion, and with Submission, a most intolerable Absurdity, to use Mr. C.'s words. For this, viz. *He cannot avoid imagining an Eternal, Infinite, or Extended Nothing;* is so far from being true, That it is absolutely Impossible for any one to imagine an Eternal, Infinite Nothing; as impossible as it is for any one to imagine, a Round, Square, or Cubical Nothing.

Is not this a strange Effort to establish an *Eternal, Infinite Extension?* Nay, 'tis asserted, That the Cartesians themselves cannot remove out of their Minds the Idea of *Imminency*, i. e. Extension, as Existing necessarily and inseparably from Eternity. Indeed they cannot remove out of their Minds, what was never in their Minds. To make Extension Eternal, is to make something Extended Eternal, as *Spinoza* and Mr. L. have done, to which they gave the *Holy Name*, God. Mr. C. goes on. Which Absurdity of theirs, (i. e. the Cartesians' Absurdity in making Matter to be a Necessary Being) in respect of the Idea of *Imminency*, i. e. Extension, proves it indeed to be necessary and impossible to be removed; b. The Cartesians are not guilty of this intolerable Absurdity, I believe it will stick close to those who attribute it to them. But this intolerable Absurdity is made to consist in

in making *Extension* necessary; and yet 'tis asserted, that this *intolerable Absurdity*, in respect of the *Idea of Immensity*, i.e. *Extension*, proves it indeed to be *necessary*. Indeed I never heard, that a *most intolerable Absurdity* proved it self to be *no Absurdity* at all, before now. It follows:

"But in respect of *Matter*, 'tis only a perverse Applying an Idea to an Object, whereto it no ways belongs, *Ibid.* I am sure a *Cartesian* would say, That this Assertion is a *most intolerable Absurdity*. I am sure that even *Spinoza* and Mr. L. would say the same, and I believe there neither is, nor ever was any body, but would confirm their Sentence besides Mr. C. I believe the Reader never heard any one say, before now, That *Extension* no ways belongs to *Matter*. Mr. C goes on, "For that it is indeed absolutely Impossible and Contradictory to suppose *Matter* necessarily Existing, shall be demonstrated presently, *Ibid.* This great haste is to confute some unknown *Cartesians*, who make *Matter* a *necessary Being*! Now I am sure that this Author cannot produce One, no, not One *Cartesian*, that ever made *Matter* to be a *Necessary-Existing Being*, that ever contradicted himself in *Words* upon this Subject, that ever was mightily, or not mightily, or at all perplexed with what Mr. C. calls his Argument; nay, that ever heard of that thing he calls his Argument. Why are they thus Misrepresented and Imposed upon? *Spinoza* promised he would consider, i. e. Confute their Arguments whereby they prove, that every *Extension* is *Matter*, and nothing else but *Matter*, i. e. no Subject of Thinking, but he never so much as offered to perform his Promise. Mr. L. Misrepresents and Imposes upon them, concerning *Extension*, and then Confutes his own *Imaginations*, which does not at all touch them. Mr. C. does the same thing, save only, that he does Confute nothing, but contents himself with those bare Assertions which we have read, and which are so singular in their kind, that I believe you never heard the like before.

I humbly desire the Reader to be perswaded, that I am of no particular *Sect.* in *Matters of Philosophy*, that I am only of the *Party of Truth*, which I embrace heartily, and defend as well as I can, where-ever I meet with it, or find it oppressed. The *Modern Atheists* having endeavoured to confound the *Difference of Substances*, and to take away the *Marks of Distinction* between them, would willingly, but could not possibly deprive *Extension* of being a *Characteristical Mark* of a *Substance*, different and *distinct* from that which *Thinks*; and since the same Endeavours are made in those Sermons, the Interest of Truth, and no other, engaged me to take notice of them, as it does, to observe what Mr. C. says, concerning the Proof drawn by the *Cartesians*, from the *Idea of a Being Infinitely Perfect*, which is the Second Argument that Mr. C. attacks in these Sermons, after some *Modern Atheists*, though it be the best Proof that *Humane Reason* has yet invented, to make out the *Existence* of the *One Only True God*. I shall first shew you the Model which Mr. C. proposed in attacking this Argument.

Mr. L. having borrowed his Notion of the *Identity* of the same *Man* from *Spinoza*, does not allow of a permanent Substance in *Man*, which may receive, and constantly retain an *Original Innate Idea of God*; consequently he wrote the First Book of his *Essay*, in order to prove, that we have no *Innate Ideas*, especially of *God*. The *Cartesians* have demonstrated that we have. In the famous *Tenth Chapter* of the *Fourth Book* of his *Essay*, wherein Mr. L. after *Spinoza*, has established the *Existence* of *Eternal Thinking Matter*, and given the *Holy Name* of *God*, to that *Chimæra*, he has these Words, *How far the Idea of a most Perfect Being, which a Man may frame in his own Mind, does, or does not prove the Existence of God, I will not here examine*, Ibid. S. 7. And this, even this, under pretence of *Zeal* for spreading the *Knowledge* of the *Existence* of *God*. And yet immediately afterwards, in the very same Section, he adds; *Tis evident some Men have no Idea of God, and*

*some*

some worse than none, and the most a very indifferent. In the first Part of this Quotation, he Misrepresents the Doctrine of the Cartesians; in the second, he renders the Argument from the Innate Idea of God useless, though out of his great Zeal, he promised in the beginning of that sect. that he would not Examine it in that place. This is 'an Artifice he makes use of throughout his whole Essay.

Mr. C. follows his Steps in this, as well as in other Matters, and expresses himself in this manner: " Our first Certainty of the Existence of God, arises not from this, that in the Idea we frame of him in our own Minds, (Mr. L's Words) or rather in the Definition that we make of the Word, (God) as signifying a Being of all possible Perfections, we include Self-Existence, Page 37. Out of respect to the Subject, I will not expose this framing of an Idea in a Definition. A Definition is only a Sign of our Idea, or Ideas; but no Idea or Ideas can be framed in it. It was expedient for Mr. C. to Misrepresent the Cartesians, as Mr. L. did. They do not say, That we Frame that Idea in our Minds, much less in a Definition; they do not say, That it depends upon us to include Self-Existence in that Idea, as Mr. C. intimates. They say, and demonstratively Prove, That every Rational Creature has, Originally, that Idea in his own Mind. That it necessarily includes Self-Existence, &c.

But Mr. C. does not say, " That that Argument is wholly inconclusive. Possibly, says he, by a very nice and accurate Deduction, it may be found to be a satisfactory Proof. But that it is not a clear and obvious Demonstration, fitted to convince and put the Atheist to Silence; (Mr. L's Words in the place before cited) appears from the endless Disputes maintained by Learned Men concerning it, without being able to satisfy each other on either side of the Question, Page 38. He misapplies the Term, Learned, in this place, and goes on, mistaking the

Men, the Thing, Reasoning, and what he would say,  
" The Obscurity, says he, and Defect of that Argument  
" seems to lie in this; that it extends only to  
" the Nominal Idea or Definition of a Self-Existing  
" Being, and does not with a sufficiently evident  
" Connexion refer and apply that Nominal Idea, Definition,  
" or Notion, which we frame in our Mind,  
" to the Real Idea of a Being actually existing without us, *Ibid.*

Above, Possibly, this Argument, by a very nice and accurate Deduction, may be found a satisfactory Proof of the Existence of God. This shews, That Mr. C. does not understand that Argument, that he does not know, whether it is, or is not a satisfactory Proof. For if he knew, it is, he would be Certain of it, because Knowledge and Certainty is one and the same thing. If he was Certain, then it would not be Possibly, but it would be Certainly, a satisfactory Proof. If he was Certain, that it is not, then it would not be Possibly; but it would be Certainly, 'tis not a satisfactory Proof. And since he does not understand it, he should not have meddled with it, much less, prefer an Absurdity to it, as you shall hereafter see he does. He says, 'Tis not a clear and obvious Demonstration fitted to convince and put the Atheist to silence. This is an Artifice borrowed from Mr. L. He should have understood it, before he pronounced this Sentence; but since 'tis given without knowing why; 'tis ipsò factō Null. And since 'tis given in Opposition to Truth, to the most Important Truth, I say, and will stand by what I say, That that Argument is a satisfactory Proof, is fit to convince, and put the Atheist to silence; and do hereby Challenge this Author, or any body else, to prove the contrary, nay to invalidate it in the least.

But Mr. C. says, That the Obscurity and Defect of that Argument seems to lie in this, &c. The Term, seems, here, certainly shews, That the Author does not know where the Obscurity or Defect of that Argument lies; or whether it has any Obscurity or Defect at all, as in reality it has not when rightly understood. Mr. ..

Mr. C. said before, That, *Possibly*, by a *very nice and accurate Deduction*, it *may be found to be a satisfactory Proof*. But here, he perceives 'tis both *Obscure* and *Defective*. If so, it is impossible it should be found to be a *satisfactory Proof* by any *Deduction* whatever. But he tells you, that the Reason of its *Obscurity* and *Defect* seems to lie in this, that it *extends only to the Nominal Idea or Definition of a Self-Existing Being*. I have not time to acquaint you with the *Rarities* of an *Argument*, which *extends only to the Definition* of what it would *prove*. Perhaps you never heard of such an *Argument* before now. I am sure you never heard of a *Nominal Idea* before now. But, *Nominal Idea* here, stands for the same thing as the *Term*, *Definition*, does. So that when Mr. C. said before, That our *certainty of the Existence of God does not arise from the Idea we frame in our own Mind, or rather in the Definition of the Word, God*: By the *Term*, *Definition* there, he meant his *Nominal Idea*, and therefore his Sense was this, *viz.* That our *Certainty of the Existence of God does not rise from the Real Idea we frame in our Nominal Idea*. I am sure a *Cartesian* would say, That this is not a *Nominal*, but a *Real Piece* of something he could name. But, I say, there neither is, nor can be such a thing as a *Nominal Idea*, *i. e.* an *Idea* that has but the *Name* of an *Idea*. For every *Idea* is a *Real Idea*. It is impossible to *frame an Idea*, even in a *Real Idea*, much less in a *Nominal Idea*; except one had the *Faculties of Sanco Panci*, who could see *Dulcinea* by *Hearsay*, *i. e.* a *Lady* in an articulate Sound, and that too, by his *Ears*.

I am likewise certain, That you never heard the *Terms*, *Nominal Idea*, *Definition*, and *Notion*, made to stand for one and the same thing before now. But in a *Second Instance*, the *Obscurity* and *Defect* of that *Cartesian Argument*, seems to Mr. C. to lie in this, That it does not with a sufficiently evident Connexion refer and apply that *Nominal Idea*, *Definition*, or *Notion*, which he frames in his own *Mind*, to the *Real Idea of a Being actually Existing without him*, Page 38. And who can help

Mr. C. labouring under this *Obscurity* and *Defect*, which he perceives, and does not perceive in that *Cartesian Argument*. He does perceive it, since he says so; and he does not perceive it, since it is *impossible* that what he calls here *Obscurity* and *Defect*, should be in that, or in any other Argument whatever. For that *Obscurity* and *Defect* consists in this, *viz.* That the *Cartesian Argument* does not with a sufficiently evident Connexion, refer and apply the Definition, to the Real Idea of a Being existing without Mr. C. Now the *Cartesians* never said, That their Argument was a Doctor of Sorbon, or any other Divine, or Philosopher, or Reasonable Creature, to whom alone it belongs, or who alone can Refer or Apply a Definition to an Idea; *i. e.* who alone can make articulate Sounds or Words, Signs or Marks of Ideas. This *Obscurity* and *Defect* therefore, neither is, nor can be, in that *Cartesian Argument*; but yet since Mr. C. perceives it, it must be somewhere, whence he may remove it when he can. He goes on.

" For it is not satisfactory that I have in my Mind  
 " an Idea of the Proposition; there Exists a Being,  
 " endued with all possible Perfections; or there is a  
 " Self-existing Being: But I must have also an Idea  
 " of the *Thing*, Page 39. You see he makes a Distinction between the Idea of the *Proposition*, and the Idea of the *Thing*. It follows, " I must have an Idea  
 " of something existing without me; and I must see  
 " wherein consists the absolute Impossibility of remov-  
 " ing that Idea, and consequently of supposing the  
 " Non-existence of the *Thing*; before I can be satisfied  
 " from that Idea, that the *Thing* actually Exists, Ib.  
 And I acquaint Mr. C. that it is absolutely Impossible for him to see wherein that absolute Impossibility consists, but from that very Idea, from which, he says, he cannot be satisfied that the *Thing* actually Exists. And if by the Term, *Thing*, in this place, he means Substance, as he should do, I remind him, that according to his *Sceptical Hypothesis*, 'tis absolutely impossible for him to have an Idea of the *Thing*; and consequently,

quently, that it is absolutely Impossible for him to see, wherein that absolute Impossibility consists. It follows:

" The bare having an Idea of the Proposition, there is a Self-Existing Being, proves indeed the Thing, not to be impossible; (for of an impossible Proposition there is properly no Idea) but that it actually is, cannot be proved from the Idea; unless the certainty of the actual Existence of a Necessarily-existing Being, follows from the possibility of the Existence of such a Being, &c. The bare having an Idea of that Proposition, does not indeed prove the Thing to be possible; for if it did, the bare having an Idea of this Proposition, There is no Self-existent Being, would prove the Thing to be impossible. But indeed, the bare having the Idea of a Proposition, proves nothing at all, for the bare Idea of a Proposition, is the Idea of the articulate Sounds whereof tis composed, as was insinuated above. There is, as properly, an Idea of an impossible, as there is, of a possible Proposition. It follows.

" Which that it does, in this particular Case, many Learned Men have indeed Thought; and it is not easily to disprove. No Learned Men indeed ever Thought so, or could Think, that the Certainty of the Actual Existence of a Necessarily-existing Being does follow from the Possibility of the Existence of such a Being.

*First, Because the Supposition includes a staring Contradiction.*

*Secondly, Because no Learned Men indeed can Think that the Actual Existence of any Being, I would say, the Certainty of the Actual Existence does follow, from the Possibility of the Existence of such a Being. And the Contraries to both may be very easily, and ought to be disproved.* It follows:

" Because it must be confessed, there is something very singular in the Idea of necessary Existence." Here he changes

changes the *Thesis*, for before his *Learned Men* thought, that the Certainty of the Actual Existence of a Necessary-Existing Being, does follow from the Possibility of the Existence of such a Being; and the Reason he gives for their thinking so, is this, *viz.* That there is something very singular in the Idea of *Necessary Existence*. That is, by the *Idea of Necessary Existence* they see the *Possible Existence*, and from the *Possible Existence*, conclude the *Actual Existence*, which they knew before in the *Necessary*, or in the *Idea of Necessary Existence*, which no *Learned Men* indeed have ever done. Mr. C. goes on:

" It being evident, That if *Necessary Existence* be (as it undeniably is) a Possible Perfection, it will consequently belong actually to a Being indued with all possible Perfections; and if it actually belongs to such a Being, it will be absolutely impossible that such a Being should not Exist; and from hence it seems to follow, that it must necessarily be true, that such a Being actually Exists." If this Argument was well understood, the Premisses would not be *precarious* and *conditional*, there would be no *If's* made use of in them, and the Conclusion would not be, it *seem*, it would be, it *certainly follows*, that such a Being must necessarily Exist, or actually Exists. 'Tis added, " This, I say, is not indeed easy to disprove." This does not necessarily conclude *actual Existence*, and so indeed, is easily to disprove. It follows. " But it is a clearer and more convincing way of Arguing, to demonstrate that there does actually Exist without us a Being, whose Existence is necessary, and of it self; from the manifest Contradiction contained in the contrary Supposition; (as I have before shown) and from the absolute Impossibility of destroying some Ideas, as of Eternity and Immensity, i. e. Extension, which therefore must needs be the Attributes of a Necessary Being actually Existing.

It being a very great Mistake, and of Importance too, in the present Case, to assert, That the Proof drawn from the manifest Contradiction contained in the contrary Supposition, is a clearer and more convincing way of Arguing, to demonstrate, that there does actually Exist without us, a Being; whose Existence is necessary, and of it self, than the *Cartesian Argument*, drawn from the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect, is; I shall help Mr. C. to mend it, by shewing, That this his way, is so far from being a clearer and more convincing Argument to prove that Truth, than the *Cartesian Argument* is, That it is neither a clear, nor a convincing, nor any Way or Argument at all to prove it.

Pray take notice, that the only Reason why we certainly know, there actually is a necessarily Exist<sup>t</sup>ent Being, is this, *viz.* because we perceive that necessary Existence is actually included in the Idea of an infinitely Perfect Being; or, which is the same thing, because we perceive an *Immutable Connexion or Agreement between Necessary Existence and an Eternal, Infinitely Perfect Being*. And whereas we must *certainly* know the *Two Propositions or Suppositions* themselves, before we can *certainly* know, that one of them is a *Contradictory Proposition or Supposition* to the other: It necessarily follows, That in the present Case, we must *certainly* know this *Proposition or Supposition*, as Mr. C. calls it, *viz.* *That there actually is a Necessarily-Exist<sup>t</sup>ent Being*, before we can *certainly* know that this *Proposition or Supposition*, *viz.* *There is not Actually Existing a Necessarily-Exist<sup>t</sup>ent Being*, is, or is not, a manifest Contradiction to it.

Now, when the former is *certainly known*, it is impossible that the latter should be, not only a *clearer* and more *convincing Proof* of the former, than the *Cartesian Argument*; but even, that it should be any *Argument or Proof* at all of that *Truth*. For the *contrary Proposition or Supposition*, cannot be *certainly known* to be a manifest Contradiction, nor so much as asserted, to be a manifest

manifest Contradiction, 'till it be cert. inly known there actually Exists a Necessarily-Existent Being; and when this is certainly known, to make use of the contrary Supposition, to prove the Existence of what we do, and must, certainly know, before we can know, that the contrary Supposition is, or is not, a manifest Contradiction, is cert. inly, and necessarily, absolutely Useless and Absurd; and so far from being a clearer and more convincing Way of Arguing to demonstrate that Truth, than the Cartesian Argument, that it is neither a clear, nor a convincing, nor any Argument or Proof at all to make out that Truth, as every one sees at first sight. As for the last Words of the Period we are upon, to wit, Eternity and Immensity, i. e. Extension, are the Attributes of a Necessary Being; as for this, I say, it being Spinoza's and Mr. L's Assertion, I shall consider it in its proper place.

But before I leave this clear and more convincing Way of Arguing, 'tis fit you should know, that 'tis from that way, Mr. C. concludes, That the only True Idea of a Self-existent or Necessarily-existing Being, is the Idea of a Being, the Supposition of whose Non-existence is an express Contradiction, Page 30. Just as if he should say, The only True Idea of a White Hat, is the Idea of a Hat, the Supposition of whose Non-whiteness is an express Contradiction. Or more properly, 'tis just as if he said, The only true Idea of a Self-conscious Substance, is the Idea of a Substance, the Supposition of whose Non-consciousness is an express Contradiction. That is, the Idea of a Self-conscious Substance, is the Idea of a Self-conscious Substance, &c. To confute the Argument made use of by D. Cudworth against Atheists, Mr. C. makes use of Spinoza's Reasoning, Page 72. After having ascribed Infinite Duration and Extension to God, as Mr. L. and Spinoza do; he makes use of Mr. L's Words, if my Memory fails me not, to shew the Vanity of the Schoolmens Endeavours to remove Infinite Duration and Extension from God. Why are those

those Endeavours made to confute; or invalidate those Arguments, which the Learned have employed to prove the Existence of God? Why are those Endeavours made, to take away our Land-marks of Distinction, between an Incogitative extended, and a Cogitative unextended Substance? Why is this Sceptical Hypothesis purposely improved to deprive us of the Means of proving the Existence of the One Only True God, established in these Sermons? This I leave with Mr. C. and the Reader to consider, and proceed to the next Point of this Third Particular, wherein I am to shew, That Mr. C. makes use of those Terms or *Cant*, invented by Mr. L. and Spinoza, in order to make Thinking and Extension, Attributes of their One single Material Substance.

That we may understand this new Gibberish, we must know the Grounds of it, as it is in Spinoza, and Translated into English by Mr. L. in his Writings, whence, I believe, Mr. C. borrowed it. Mr. L's Essay, in the Main, is but Spinoza translated into, improved in the English Language, and set off more Subtilly under another Dres and Sett of articulate Sounds or Terms. That you may see this in one View, and certainly perceive the Truth of what I have said, do, and shall say, concerning this Matter; I'll set before you the very Basis of Spinoza's Atheism, and indeed of the Atheism of all others, in his own Words, and in those Terms, wherein Mr. L. Translated it into English. Thus Spinoza has it:

The Thinking and Extended Substance, is one and the same; which is conceived, now, under the Attribute of Thinking, and, by and by, under the Attribute of Extension.

Here are Mr. L's Words, The general Idea of Substance being the same every where, the Modification of Thinking, or the Power of Thinking joyned to it, makes it a Spirit, without considering what other Modifications it has, as whether

Substantia cogitans, & substantia extensa una, eademque est substantia, qua jam sub hoc, jam sub illius Attributo comprehenditur. Ethic. P. 2. Schol. Prop. 72.

ther it has the Modification of Solidity or no. & 243 on the other side Substance, that has the Modification of Solidity is Matter, whether it has the Modification of Thinking or no. L. i. B. W. Page 66.

You see these Two Authors say one and the same thing, as to this single Ground and Foundation of all Atheism. The Term Solidity with Mr. L. stands for the same thing, the Word Extension does with Spinoza. Mr. L. in the same Letter now quoted, speaking of the Substance wherein the Properties of a Man do inheret, as he Phrases it, has these Words: " How that " Substance wherein the Properties of Man do inheret... " is differently Modified in the different Species of Creatures, " so as to have different Properties and Powers " whereby they are distinguished, that also we have " very Obscure, or rather no Distinct Ideas of at all. " Page 48." You see he Imagines, with Spinoza, 'tis one and the same Substance, differently Modified, that is in Man, and in the other Species of Creatures; and that they differ only, but in a bare different Modification of one and the same Substance.

Though Spinoza asserts, That the Substance which he Blasphemously calls God, is Material, or Matter;

\* Omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum, negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo, quod per corpus intelligimus quamcumque quantitatem, longam, latam, & profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito dici potest. Ethic. P. I. Schol. Prop. 15. \* All those who have in any degree considered the Divine Nature, deny that God is Corporeal. Which they prove very well, because by Body, we understand any Quantity, long, large, and profound, bound by a certain Figure, which to ascribe to God, viz. a Being absolutely Infinite, nothing can be more Absurd. Hence it is, that some of the

few Followers of this Atheist, scruple not to say, That God is an Immortal Substance, meaning, that he is not the Gross Quantity, that Divisible, Sensible, Figured Bulk or Compages, which we call Body.

Spinoza

Spinoza adds, That Water, as Water, is divisible; and its Parts, separable one from another; but that as a corporeal Substance, it is neither divisible nor separable; That Water, as Water, is generated and corrupted; but that as a corporeal Substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted. . . . Nay, there is no reason why the extended Substance should be thought unworthy the Divine Nature, though it be supposed divisible, provided it's granted to be Eternal and Infinite.

You see what senseless Cant this Man is forced to make use of, in order to give some Colour of Consistency to his Hypothesis, whereby he endeavours to prove, that God is Material, or Matter. Hence it is, that Mr. L. borrowed his Jargon of Bare, Pure, Meer Matter, of Matter, &c.

After having prepared the Means in the rest of his Essay, he at length compleatly established his own, and Spinoza's Hypothesis, in the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of the said Essay. In the Ninth Section of that Chapter he divides the Beings in all the World, that Man knows or conceives, into Two Sorts. First, Purely Material, as the Clippings of his Beard, which afterwards he calls, Bare, Pure, Meer Incognitivè Matter, Matter as Matter, &c. Secondly, Sensible, Thinking, Perceiving Beings, such as we find our selves to be. In another place he does not exclude Materiality out of the Idea for which he makes the Term, Spirit, to stand, when thereby he would signify the Thinking Substance in us; and he leaves Immateriality out of it. L. i. B. W. Page 68. That is, he takes the Thinking Substance in us to be Matter or Material; and 'tis for this reason, that he imagines 'tis the same Substance that is in Us, and in the other different Species of Creatures, differently Modified, as you have read before.

\* Aquam, quatenus aqua est, dividi concipi possumus, ejusque partes ab invicem separari; at non quatenus Substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur, neque dividitur. Porro aqua, quatenus aqua, generatur, & corruptitur; at quatenus Substantia, nec generatur, nec corruptitur. . . . Nulla ratione dici potest, Substantiam extensam divinam naturam indignam esse, tametsi divisibilis supponatur, dummodo eterna, & infinita concedatur. Ibid.

Now, since according to him, the Thinking Substance in us is Material, that in God must be Material too, because, by that Ninth Section, he is a Sensible Thinking Being, such as we our selves are. And since it is one and the same Substance that is in Us, and in the other Creatures, it must be one and the same Substance that is in God, and in the other Creatures too; differently Modified, that is, a Material Substance. Mr. C. grants that the Eternal Cogitative Being may be Material, calls this Eternal Thinking Matter by the Name, A God, teaches his Men of Matter, that the Danger and Deceit of this Hypothesis, consists in forgetting that Eternal Matter is Cogitative, in establishing the Existence of an Eternal Spirit, instructs them how to avoid this Error, Ibid. S. 13, and precisely determines that what he calls, A God, is some certain System of Eternal Thinking Matter, duly put together, Ibid. S. 16. By the Assistance of Spinoza's Jargon, he makes a shew, and but a bare shew, of arguing against this Hypothesis. He says, That All Matter cannot Think, because in the Terms, All Matter, he includes Matter as Substance, and Matter, as the Modification of that Substance, to wit, Bare, Pure, Meer, Incogitative Matter, and consequently, all Matter in that Sense, cannot Think. He says, That, All Matter, as Matter, cannot Think; because by that Reduplication, he Restrains and Determines the general Terms, All Matter, to stand for All Matter, as a Modification, or as a Pure, Meer, Incogitative Matter, which consequently cannot Think. By this Gibberish he established Spinoza's Hypothesis, and so imposed upon some Readers, that they thought he established in that Chapter, what he really and designedly Destroys in it, to wit, the Existence of the One Only True God.

Now, Mr. C. borrowed this Jargon, as I believe, out of this famous Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of the *Essay of Humane Understanding*: At least, the Form of his Proof, a good part of his Reasoning, and this new Cant he makes use of, are in that Chapter. I have not time to cite, much less to insist upon all the places

places wherein Mr. C. makes use of these *Equivocating Terms*. He has all the Terms of *meer Matter*, Page 70. *Meer Effect or Composition of Unintelligent*, i. e. *Incogitative, Figure and Motion*, Page 103. *Meer Unintelligent*, i. e. *Incogitative Matter*, Page 123. *All Matter, as Matter*, Page 187, &c. Now these *Epithets and Reduplications*, would be *Vain, Useless, and Absurd*, if this Author did not imagine with Mr. L. and Spinoza, that there is another sort of *Matter*, which is not a *Meer, Bare, Pure, Incogitative Matter*. These Terms necessarily import this Sense, which will appear more fully from my Third Point, wherein I am to shew, That Mr. C. Misrepresents Spinoza and Hobbs, I mean in his English Translation of those Authors, &c.

We have observed, That he Misrepresents Spinoza in the very first Quotation he brings out of him, Page 50. Spinoza says, as you remember, That one Substance cannot be produced by another; That all Substance is necessarily Infinite; That it belongs to the Nature of Substance to exist; and that, besides God, no Substance, either is, or can be conceived. Which Mr. C. renders thus: Spinoza taught there is no difference of Substances; but that the Whole, and every Part of the Material World is a Necessary-Existing Being, and that there is no other God but the Universe. You see Spinoza is quite misrepresented. Mr. C. adds, That Spinoza expressly denies, that God is a Substance distinct from the Material World, Page 53. Again, "We may observe," says Mr. C. the *Vanity*, "*Folly*, and *Weakness* of Spinoza, who because *Self-Existent Nature* must necessarily be but One, concludes from thence, that the whole World, and every Thing contained therein, is one Uniform Substance, Eternal, Uncreated and Necessary, Page 96.

The Terms, *Self-Existent Nature*, are new, and belong to Mr. C. as well as his Translation here, which

*Una Substantia non potest produci ab alia.* Ethic. Part. 3. Prop. 6.

*Ad Naturam Substantie pertinet Existere.* Prop. 7.

*Praeter Deum nulla dari, neque concipi potest Substantia.* Prop. 8.

is quite different from Spinoza's Sense and Words, as you see! Once more:

Mr. C. misrepresents Spinoza, and reduces his Opinion, upon this Head; to this, viz. That the Material World, and every Part of it, with the Order and Manner of Being of each Part, is the only Self-Existent, or Necessarily-Existing Being, Page 55. This, he says; he has confuted, and concludes, that he has demonstrated Spinoza's Opinion to be false. Page 57.

Now Spinoza never taught this Doctrine he imputes to him here, and elsewhere, nay he taught the quite contrary; as you have partly seen already, and shall more fully perceive, if you please to read what follows.

*Prop. 15. Deum non sicut hominem corpore, & Mente constanter, atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt; sed quia longe hi à verâ Dei cogitatione aberrant, satis ex jam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto: nam omnes, qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum, negant, &c. Ethic. Part. I. Schol. Prop. 15.*

There are some, says Spinoza, who imagine God, like a Man, consisting of Body and Mind, and subject to Passions; but how widely they Err in this, sufficiently appears from what has been demonstrated. But these I dismiss: For all those, who have in any degree considered the Divine Nature, deny that God is Corporeal, &c. You see that far from Asserting, he plainly and precisely denies, That God is Corporeal.

Attamen quod quidam putant, Tractatum Theologico-Politicum eo niti, quod Deus, & Natura (per quam massam quandam, sive materiam corporream intelligent) unum, & idem sint, tota errant via. Epist. 21.

Pray hear him again: As for those who think my Theologico Political Treatise is built upon this Supposition, that God and Nature (by which they understand, a certain Mass, or corporeal Matter) are one and the same Thing; they are quite mistaken.

Spinoza is equally misrepresented in the other Part of the Charge, to wit, That he makes every Part of the Material World, with the Order and manner of Being of each Part to be Self-Existent; as you may see by the following Words:

*Prop. 16. Quoniam ergo in rebus materialibus, non potest existere nisi in se, & in aliis, & non potest existere nisi in aliis, & in se, & non potest existere nisi in aliis, &c. Now as I told you*

Whenever we consider the Essence of Things, we find it does not include, either Duration or Existence; and therefore their Essence cannot be the Cause, either of their Duration or Existence, but God only, - to whose Nature alone it belongs to Exist. Again, \* If we proceed to Infinity, we may easily conceive that all Nature is but one Individual, whose Parts, that is, all Bodies do Change infinite Ways, without any Change of the Whole Individual. absque illâ totius Individui Mutatione. Ethic. Part. 2. Schol. Prop. 7.

From the whole, it is as plain as Print can make it, That *Spinoza* expressly teaches the quite contrary Doctrine to that, with which he is charged by Mr. C. and which this Author confutes as his *Atheism*. We must not forget, 'tis by the Assistance of *Spinoza's* and Mr. L's equivocating Cant, that Mr. C. misrepresents, and makes a show of Arguing against those Authors which he professes to confute, even when he proves nothing but what they assert. Of this we have seen Examples already, and therefore I shall now quote but Two Passages to this purpose, which are the following:

"If Bare Matter be the Necessarily-Existing Being, says Mr. C. then in that Necessarily-Existence there is either included the Power of Gravitation, or not, &c. Page 48." You see 'tis *Bare Matter*, which he excludes from being the Necessarily-Existing Being. And you know this *Bare Matter* is the very *Thing* which *Spinoza*, and Mr. L. after him, do expressly descriptive of *Sense*, *Perception*, and *Thought*, and exclude from being the Necessarily-Existing Being. Again, he says, That Hobbs is forced \* to recur to that prodigiously absurd Supposition, That all Matter, as Matter, is endued not only with Figure and Capacity of Motion, but also with an actual Sense.

Quicunque ad earum, i.e. Rerum, essentium attendimus, eandem nec existentiam nec durationem involvere compemus; adeoque earum essentia, neque sive existentia, neque sive durationis potest esse causa; sed tantum Deus, ad cuius solam Naturam pertinet existere. Ethic. Part. 1. Corol. Prop. 34.

\* Et si porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiimus, totam naturam unum esse Individuum, cuius partes, hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variantur,

absque illâ totius Individui Mutatione. Ethic. Part. 2. Schol. Prop. 7.

\* Scio fuisse Philosophos quosdam, eosdemque viros doctos, qui corpora omnia sensa praedita esse sustinuerunt nec video, &c. Hobbs Physic. Cap. 25. Sect. 5.

or Perception, i. e. Thought, Page 117. You see Hobbs has not the Reduplication of All Matter, as Matter. That Reduplication restrains or determines the general Terms, All Matter, to stand only for Bare, Pure, Meer; Incogitative Matter, i. e. for Matter as a Modification, which is an imposing piece of Contrivance, which was not yet invented in Hobbs's time, and whereof, I believe, he never thought. Now this is exactly what Spinoza and Mr. L. say. They assert, That all Matter, as Matter, i. e. Bare, Pure, Meer Matter; Matter as a Modification does not Percieve or Think, and is not, their Necessarily-Existent Being. 'Tis by this Equivocating, Senseless Cant, that Mr. L. made a show of Confuting, and in reality Established Spinoza's Hypothesis.

As for Spinoza's main Purpose; thus Mr. C. misrepresents it. "If Spinoza's Definition of Substance be true, then neither Matter, nor Spirit, nor any Finite Being whatsoever, is in that Sense properly a Substance, but (the ö sv) the Self-Existent Being alone, and so it will prove Nothing to his main Purpose, which was to make us believe that there is no such Thing as Power or Liberty in the Universe, &c. P. 99. Mr. C. could not know what Spinoza's main Purpose was, but by what he wrote. It is evident from his Writings, That his main Purpose was to establish his Hypothesis of One single extended Substance, the very Basis of his, and of all Atheism. It seems Mr. C. knew this, when he said in this very Period, That if Spinoza's Definition of Substance is false, then his whole Doctrine built upon it, falls at once to the Ground. Therefore his Hypothesis of One Substance is the Foundation of his whole Doctrine built upon it. Therefore his main Purpose was to establish that Foundation. Besides, Power and Liberty, or no Power or Liberty, being Consequents upon, and Attributes agreeing or disagreeing to the Nature of the Substance which Spinoza intended to establish; it is evident, That his uniting them to, or his separating them from the said Substance, neither was, nor coulding be his main Purpose. Here, as well as in other places of those Sermons, the Accessory is made the

the Essential, and the misrepresented Accessory argued against, whilst the Essential Hypothesis is left in its full force, to speak it softly.

Indeed what Mr. C. asserts here, is very surprizing, to wit, *That if according to Spinoza's Opinion, neither Matter, nor Spirit, nor any Finite Being, was properly a Substance; that if there was no other Substance but his (ò öv) his Self-Existent Being alone; yet this, even this, would prove Nothing to his main Purpose.* This, I say, is surprizing beyond Expression. For it is intuitively Evident and Certain, That his Self-Existent Being alone admitted, the Existence of the One Only True God is utterly Destroy'd, *Atheism Established*, and all the Religion and Revelation which we either practice or believe, sentenced to be nothing else but a *superstitious Frenzy*, and the Heats of disordered Imaginations. For Spinoza's Self-Existent Being is an *Eternal, Infinitely Extended, i. e. Material Substance*, as every one knows. Now this alone admitted, not only Spinoza's, but even the *main Purpose* of all the *Atheists* that are, or ever shall be in the World, is compleatly established, as every one sees at first sight. But to return from this amazing Assertion to what we were upon, *Spinoza is misrepresented even in reference to this Accessory*; for 'tis said, *That by the Necessity of the Divine Nature, he means an Absolute and strictly Natural Necessity*, Page 128. And makes his God to be a Cause or Agent in no other Sense, than as if a Man should say, that a Stone by the necessity of its Nature is the Cause of its own falling and striking the Ground, Page 129. So that he does not *Act*, but is *Acted upon*, Page 128.

Now Spinoza is so far from reducing what he calls, God, to this *Absolute and strictly Natural Necessity* described by Mr. C. that on the contrary he says,

\* *That God Acts by the Laws of his own Nature, and without being forced by any; and infers, Secondly, That God alone is a free Cause.* 'Tis a thing absolutely impossible according to

Spinoza's Hypothesis, that what he Blasphemously calls God, should be *Acted upon*. For if there be in the World but one single extended Substance, as he erroneously pretends, and that all things are but different Modifications

\* Deus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus, & à nomine coactus agit. *Ethic. Part. 1. Prop. 17.*

Sequitur II, solum Deum esse causam liberam. *Carol. 2. Prop. ejus ibid.*

of that single Substance, as he says; it is impossible it should be *Acted* upon by any other *Agent*, since according to that Hypothesis, there neither is, nor can be any other

\* Nulla ratione dici potest, *Agent*. Nay, *Spinoza* himself asserts Deum ab alio pati, *Ethic. Part. I.* more than once, \* *That God can by Schol. Prop. 15. no means be Acted upon.*

Indeed, I think, 'tis Mr. C. that is guilty of what he groundlessly imputes to *Spinoza* in the Passages quoted above. Here are his Words: "There is a *Fitness* or *Suitableness* of certain Circumstances to certain Persons, and an *unsuitableness* to others, founded in the *Nature* of *Things*, and the *Qualifications* of Persons, *Antecedent* to *Will*, and to *All Arbitrary or Positive Appointment* whatsoever, 234. Again, "There is therefore such a thing as *Fitness* and *Unfitness*, *Eternally, Necessarily*, and *Unchangeably* in the *Nature* and *Reason* of *Things*, Page 235." He adds, *That this Fitness or Unfitness, Eternally, Necessarily, and Unchangeably in the Nature of Things, Antecedently to Will, and to all Positive or Arbitrary Appointment whatsoever*; "does always and *Necessarily Determine the Will of God*, Page 256." I think *Spinoza* does not, nor cannot, according to his Hypothesis, reduce what he calls *Self-Existent Being*, to a more *absolute* and *strictly Natural Necessity*, than Mr. C. does, what he calls *Self-Existent Being*, by those groundless and positive Assertions, and which plainly import the *Eternal Necessary Co-existence* of all things, &c. Mr. L. indeed says the same thing that Mr. C. says, and that in the following Words: *Thus the Idea of a right-lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this Connexion of these two Ideas to be possibly Mutable, or to depend upon any Arbitrary Power which of Choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise.* *Essay, B. 4. C. 3. S. 29.* This amounts to what Mr. C. says; but *Spinoza* arguing against the *Liberty* ordinarily ascribed to God, speaks more

Sed hoc idem est, ac si diceantur, quod Deus potest efficere, ut ex naturâ trianguli non sequatur, ejus tres angulos aequales esse duobus rectis, &c. *Ethic. Part. I. Schol. Prop. 17.*

within compass in these Terms: But this is as much as if they said, that God can cause it should not follow from the *Nature* of a *Triangle*, that its three *Angles* should be equal to two right ones, &c.

I shall

I shall hereafter consider the Nature and Circumstances of those *Misrepresentations*, and before I quit this Third Point, shew you, what Mr. C. says concerning *Immaterial Substance* in the manner following.

" From hence we may observe  
" the Vanity, Folly, and Weakness *The Error of Spinoza.*

" of Spinoza; who because *Self-Existent Nature* must necessarily be but one, concludes from thence, that the *Whole World*, and every thing contained therein, is *One Uniform Substance, Eternal, Uncreated and Necessary*: Whereas, just on the contrary, he ought to have concluded, that because all Things in the *World* are distinguished one from the other by a Diversity, not only of Modes, but also of *Essential Attributes*, and consequently (if we have any knowledge at all of them) of their Substances themselves also, &c, Page 97.

We have already observed, That *Spinoza* is misrepresented in the beginning of this Quotation; and I think the Words, *Self-Existent Nature* are new Terms in the English Language, and have some Affinity with *Spinoza's Nature Naturing*, and *Nature NATURE*.

You see that by the Terms, *Things*, in this last Period, Mr. C. understands *Substances*; and though he says, that they are distinguished, not only by a *Diversity of Modes*, but even of *Essential Attributes*, yet I must crave leave to remind him, that he neither does, nor can know any thing at all of the matter, according to the *Sceptical Hypothesis* established in his Sermons. For as it would be absolutely impossible for a Man that neither has, nor can have, the Ideas of a right-lined Triangle, and of a Paralellogram, either to perceive or prove, either mediately or immediately, that to have its three Angles equal to two right ones, is an *Essential Property* or *Attribute* of a right-lined Triangle, and not of a Paralellogram: So, likewise, it is absolutely impossible for Mr. C. who neither has, nor can have, the Idea of this, or that, or of any real Substance whatever, either to know, perceive, or prove; either mediately or immediately, that this or that, or t'other *Property* or *Attribute*, is an *Essential Property* or *Attribute* of this, or that, or t'other real *Substance* whatever, even upon the

Supposition of the Plurality of Substances, which this equivocating *Cant of Bare, Meer, &c. Matter*, disproves. This Mr. C. knew, as it appears by his adding the Parenthesis, (*if we have any knowledge at all of them*) upon which depends Mr. C's Knowledge and Certainty of what he says before and after it. Now that Parenthesis being conditional, Mr. C's Knowledge or Certainty of its Truth, depends upon his Knowledge or Certainty of the Truth of the conditional Particle *If*, with which it begins. And that we may plainly perceive Mr. C's meaning in this place, let us form an Argument, and compose its two first Propositions of his own Words, in the following manner.

*If we have any knowledge at all of Substances, they are distinguished by a Diversity, not only of Modes, but also of Essential Attributes,* Page 97.

*But we are Utterly Ignorant of the Substance or Essence, even of those Things we converse most familiarly with, and think we understand best,* Page 76 and 77.

Therefore we are Utterly Ignorant whether they are distinguished by a Diversity of Essential Attributes; and consequently, whether there are more Substances than One in the Whole World.

This is Mr. C's Case, according to his own Hypothesis, as has been already proved, in his own Way. The Reasoning here, is Sophistical. Instead of proving, that Substances are Essentially different, or that there are more than One; it asserts, that we know nothing at all of the matter. It is employed more than once in those Sermons, as namely, Page 165, wherin Mr. C. proves there are Immortal Substances, by such an Argument, as that we have now seen. But since he asserts elsewhere; *That Thinking and Willing are necessarily Powers or Faculties of Immortal Substances*, Pag. 189. and that the Limits I am confined to, will not permit me to insist particularly upon what he says concerning those Substances; I shall only remind you, that Spinoza and Mr. L. say, That the Substance which they call, God, is an Immortal Substance, and that it is a Material Substance. Immortal, as not being their Bare Incogitative Matter, their Matter, as a Modification. Material, as being their Matter, as Substance. This is the Sense wherein they take

the Term, *Immaterial*, and wherein every one that makes use of the Equivocating Cant of *Bare Incoercive Matter, &c.* must take it. One would be apt to think, that this is the Sense wherein Mr. C. takes the word *Immaterial*, even by what he says in the same Paragraph, *Page 118.* Having sufficiently insisted upon the Misrepresentations I purposed to speak to in this Third Point, and produced some Instances of Mr. C's Arguments against the Hypothesis of One Substance; I now proceed to my Fourth and Last Particular, wherein I am to shew, That Mr. C. restrains and determines what he calls Self-Existent Being, as Mr. L. and Spinoza do, what they call by that Name, whereby we shall come better acquainted with what he calls *Immaterial Substances.* In order to set what shall be said in a due Light, let us take the following Method.

Mr. L. employs the first *Twelve Sections of the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of his Essay*, to prove, That there is an *Eternal, all Powerful, Perceiving, Cogitative Being.*

Mr. C. in his Twelve Propositions asserts, That there is an *Eternal, Infinite, Intelligent, Powerful, &c. Being.*

Spinoza says, There is an *Infinitely Perfect Being.*

And the Worthy and Excellent Prelate, Edward, late Lord Bishop of Worcester, in his Writings against Mr. L. asserts, That there is an *Eternal Infinitely Perfect Being.*

Now the General, Vague, Loose, Undetermined Term, *Being*, in all those Propositions signifies no more but *Something*, and that *Something* stands for the *Substance* to which the *Attributes* named in those Propositions are ascribed. And since the Impudent Folly of *Atheism* has brought an *Eternal Chimærical Something or Substance*, in Competition with the *Real, Eternal Something or Substance*; the Question is to know precisely, which of these two *Infinitely different Somethings or Substances* is meant by each of those Authors, when he expresses himself in those, now Equivocal Terms: *There is an Eternal, &c. Being.*

Spinoza determines and restrains his *Vague Something*, by ascribing *Infinite Extension, Space, Place, &c.* to it. In a word, by saying, \* *That Extension is an Attribute of God, or that God is an extended Thing or Something;* and con-

\* *Extensio Attributum Dei est, sive Deus est res extensa.*  
*Ethic. Part. 2. Prop.*  
sequently

sequently he declares that the Substance he calls by the Name, *God*, is *Material or Matter*. Mr. L. restrains and determines his loose *Something*, by ascribing *Infinite Duration, Space, Place, Expansion*, i. e. Extension, to it, as *Spinoza* has done. "He imagines 'tis by repeating our Ideas of *Distance or Space*, that we get the Idea of *Immenity*." *Essay*, B. 2. C. 13. S. 4. And then, "leaves it to every one to consider, whether he will think the Words of the most knowing King Solomon, *The Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain Thee*; or those more emphatical ones of the inspired Philosopher St. Paul, *In him we live, move, and have our Being*, are to be understood in a literal Sense, *Ibid.* S. 26." This he learnt from his Master

\* Omnia inquit, in Deo esse, & in Deo moveri cum Paulo affirmo. Epist. 21. \* I affirm with Paul, that all things are in God, and move in God. By the

Term, *God*, you know, he understands, *Matter*, as *Substance*; which is the *God*, wherein he imagines we *Live* and *Move*. This too, is what Mr. L. means by his *Literal Sense*, in the foregoing Passage.

Mr. L. derives the word *Duration* from *Durare*, and *This* from *Durum esse*. *Essay*, B. 2. C. 15. S. 4. He says, "Tis the very Nature both of *Duration* and *Expansion* to consist of Parts, *Ibid.* S. 9. but that the Ideas of *Length* he has of *Expansion*, are turned every Way, and so make *Figure*, and *Breadth* and *Thickness*, *Ibid.* S. 11". Hereby you see, that by the Term, *Expansion*, he means exactly the same thing that others do, by the Word, *Extension*, to wit, *Matter*. He continues; "Expansion and Duration do mutually imbrace, and comprehend each other; every Part of *Space*, (i. e. *Expansion*) being in every Part of *Duration*; and every Part of *Duration* in every Part of *Expansion*, *Ibid.* S. 12. Duration and Expansion in their full Extent, (i. e. Infinite) belong only to the *Deity*, *Ibid.* S. 18." Thus Mr. L. after *Spinoza*, restrains and determines his *Eternal Something*, and consequently asserts it to be *Material or Matter*, in the Chapter and Sections I directed to before.

The Learned and Excellent Prelate before-mentioned, with all Christians and truly Reasonable Men, restrains and determines his *Eternal Being*, or *Something*, to stand: For a .  
mif

most Spiritual and Infinite Substance. L's r. L. to the B. of W. Page 86. Most Spiritual, says this really Great Man! whereby we see that he thought Words could not sufficiently express the Infinite Distance between his Idea of the Substance he calls God, and any sort of Matter whatever. Mr. C. speaks upon this Subject as Mr. L. does, saving that the former puts the Coach before the Horses in the immediately following Period: "Infinite Space is Nothing Else but an abstract Idea of Immensity or Infinity; even as Infinite Duration is of Eternity. Indeed Eternity and Immensity, i. e. Extension, seem both to be but Attributes of an Essence Incomprehensible to us, i. e. of the Divine Essence, Page 97." He ascribes Eternal Duration to his Self-Existent Being in the following Words: "How an Eternal Duration can be now actually Past, is a Thing utterly impossible for our narrow Understanding to comprehend; and yet to deny the Truth of the Proposition, would be to assert something still far more unintelligible, Page 19." You know it is utterly Impossible to assert something still far more Unintelligible, than a Thing utterly Impossible for our Understanding to comprehend; but Nothing can be more Unintelligible than to assert, That an Eternal Duration is now actually Past. 'Tis a Contradiction. 'Tis said; That the Cartesians cannot remove out of their Minds the Idea of Immensity, i. e. Extension, as Existing Necessarily, and Inseparably from Eternity, Page 33. Again, "The Infinity of the Self-Existing Being, must be an Infinity of Fulness as well as of Immensity, i. e. Extension, Page 89." Thus Mr. C. after Mr. L. restrains and determines his Eternal Being or Something, by ascribing Infinite Duration, Space, Place, Fulness, Immensity, i. e. Extension, &c. to it.

Now the Men argued against in those Sermons, finding therein that Sceptical Hypothesis made use of, which has been of late so industriously Improved; in order to cut off all possible Means of proving the Difference of Real Substances, of perceiving or proving the Existence of the One Only True God, or that he is different from their own pretended One Only Eternal Infinitely Extended, i. e. Material Substance; they will be apt to conclude, that This is the Reason why that Hypothesis is established in these Sermons.

mons. Finding therein, that *Spinoza* is made to assert, *That the Material World, and every Part of it, with the Order and Manner of Being of each Part, is the Only Self-Existent Being*; and that this is represented and confuted as his Hypothesis which he plainly denies to belong to him, nay, to which he precisely teaches a Doctrine quite contrary in every Part of it, and that by this Means, his *Real Hypothesis* and *Atheism* is over-look'd; they will be apt to conclude, That this is an Artifice purposely contrived to make a shew of Arguing against him, and so elude Confuting his Real Hypothesis, which is one Way to establish it. Finding therein, that even when his *Real Hypothesis*, i. e. his Definition and Doctrine of Substance, is stated; 'tis said only, *That if it be true, it will serve nothing to his main Purpose*; (which yet, if true, will compleatly serve his, and the *main Purpose* of all *Atheists* that are, or ever shall be) and then, that here again, a misrepresented Accessory is argued against, and his main Hypothesis left in its full force; they will be apt to conclude as before. Finding therein, the constant Use, or rather Abuse, that is made of the Equivocating Jargon of *Bare*, *Pure*, *Meer Incogitative Matter*, &c. whereby *Hobbs* and *Spinoza* are misrepresented; they will take hold of it more ways than one. They will say, That in a continued Series of Discourse, one would no more make use of the Words, *Bare*, *Pure*, *Meer Incogitative Matter*, &c. if he did not imagine with Mr. L. and *Spinoza*, that there is another sort of Matter, which is not a *Bare*, *Pure*, *Meer*, *Incogitative Matter*; than he would of the Terms, *Bare*, *Pure*, *Meer Incogitative Musick*, *Rose* or *Tulip*, if he did not fancy there is a sort of *Musick*, *Rose* or *Tulip*, which is not *Barely*, *Purely*, *Meerly Incogitative*. They know that whoever allows this Chimærical Distinction of Matter, must admit *Spinoza*'s and Mr. L's Hypothesis. That when he mentions an *Immaterial Substance* singly, he must mean with those Authors a *Material Substance*, that is not his *Bare*, *Meer Incogitative Matter*, his *Matter* as a *Modification*, but his *Matter* as *Substance*, in which Sense, they take the Term *Immaterial*. And that whoever admits this Distinction, and the Sceptical Hypothesis in those Sermons, when he mentions more *Substances* than One, as different

ferent particular Substances, whether Material, or Immaterial; he must mean with Mr. L. different Nominal Substances, i.e. the different Collections of Properties or Qualities perceivable in those Beings commonly called Material and Immortal Substances, but not different Real Substances, as we shall see presently, if we have room enough. To this they will add the Efforts made in those Sermons, to confute and invalidate Arguments made use of by the best Philosophers and Divines, to fix the Difference of Real Substances, and to prove the Existence of the One Only True God; and to substitute in their place, Mr. L's Argument, which does not, nor cannot, nor was intended by him to prove any thing else, but the Existence of Spinoz.'s One Substance; and then, from every Part of the Whole, they will be apt to conclude singly, and proportionably, as before; especially when they reflect, that this very same Design, upon this same Subject, in this same Equivocating Cant, and by the help of this same Sceptical Hypothesis; has been already carried on with some Success, by one who dreamed the same things they imagine.

When to all this they shall add, That in those Sermons there is not one Argument offer'd, to prove against Spinoza, that God is a Spirit, or an Infinitely Perfect and perfectly Immortal Unextended Substance, &c. That their whole Proof, like that of the Twelve-first Sections of the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr. L's Essay; is conceived in General, Vague, Loss, Undetermined, Equivocal Terms, such as Supreme Cause, Self-Existent Nature, Necessarily-Existent Being, &c. all which may be made to stand for Spinoza's One Substance, as well as for the One Only True God; and that to fix and settle the precise meaning of that Undetermined Being, Something or Substance; 'tis restrain'd and Determined by the Attributes of Eternal Infinite Duration, Immortality, i.e. Extension, Space, Place, Fulness, &c. They will conclude, that this Self-Existent Being, Something or Substance, is the very same with Spinoz.'s and Mr. L's Self-Existent Being, Something or Substance. And 'tis in order that Mr. C. should timely prevent them, to Second his avowed Design in those Sermons, and that of the Religious, and in our Days, especially, Most Useful Lecture at St. Paul's, that I have

42 Remarks upon Mr. Clarke's Sermons, &c.

now laid before you those Reasons which my prescribed Time allowed me to produce, and which perswade me, that those Sermons do rather Establish than Destroy, do rather Confirm than Confute Spinoza's Hypothesis. Yet I have not said, and am far from saying here, That Mr. C. intended to Favour, much less to Establish that Hypothesis. 'Tis likely he has been imposed upon by Mr. L's Sophisms and Equivocations. But when the End we Aim at in Writing, is the Glory of God, and the Improvement of our Knowledge of Him; this same Motive, upon the Discovery of a Mistake in what we assert concerning Him, will engage us to Correct it. St. Augustin has left us a Whole Book of Retractions. The Religious and Learned Mr. Grabe in his *Irenæus*, B. 3. Page 220. has given us an Example of this kind.

A perfect Knowledge of Mr. L's Hypothesis would engage any one to forfeit it; here is what he says in his Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, Page 151. " It requires some skill for any one to represent me as your Lordship does here, as one Ignorant or Doubtful, whether Matter may not think, to that degree, that I am not certain, or do not believe that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World, and consequently all Revelation may be nothing but the Effects of an exalted Fancy, or the Heats of a disordered Imagination, as Spinoza affirm'd. Never was any Man more exactly Represented, more like himself, more to the Life than Mr. L. thus Represented by that Great Prelate. This can be Mathematically demonstrated, as also, That Mr. L. did not know what he said, That he was Unreasonable, that he Reasoned himself out of Reason it self, in his Endeavours to Reason our Great God out of Being, and to Establish Spinoza's Hypothesis; and all this, by his own Principles. The Tenor of these Sheets is submitted to the Judgment of those, who have a Natural Right to Judge of Tracts of this kind.











